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NOTES  FOR  SPEECH  BY  ROY  DENMAN  TO  WASHINGTON 
INTERNATIONAL  TRADE  ASSOCIATION  -DECEMBER  21,  1982 
U.S.-EEC  TRADING  RELATIONS 
Have  spoken  on  this  subject  several  times  in  the  past 
year.  Freely  confess  that  I  have  often  sounded  like  a 
skeleton  at  the  feast.  Not  the  thing  for  this  time  of 
year. 
But  themes  don't  always  deserve  the  same  conclusions. 
Like  the  old  joke  about  Cambridge  examination  papers  -
the  questions  remain  the  same  but  the  answers  vary. 
But  before  giving  you  my  answer  to  this  examination 
question  a  bit first  of  ~ackground. 
Why  are  U.S.-EEC  relations  so  important? 
Should  we  not  be  worrying  about  other  areas  of  the 
world? 
And  questions  other  than  trade. 
In  answer  I  give  you  several  reflections. 2
First  the  interests  of  the  u.s. 
For  something  like  100  years  after  the  Civil  War  foreign 
trade  did  not  account  for  more  than  3-4%  of  American 
GNP.  Then  in  the  1970's  it  took  off.  In  1980  it 
accounted  for  some  12%. 
Something  like  one  fifth  of  American  industrial 
production  is  exported. 
Nearly  a  half  u.s.  current  4  out  of  every  5 
manufacturing  jobs  created  in  the  u.s.  between  1977  and 
1980  were  linked  to  exports. 
So  foreign  trade  is vital  to  American  jobs  and  the 
American  standard  of  living.  Unemployment  now  is  the 
highest  for  40  years.  What  would  it be  if  your  foreign 
trade  collapsed? 
Then  your  interests  in  Community  market 
With  the  Community  as  a  trading  partner  in  1980  you  ran 
with  us  a  surplus  of  25  billion dollars  on  merchandise 
trade,  7  billion  in  the  agricultural  field. 
Our  joint world  responsibility 3
The  u.s.-EEC  together  account  for  one  third  of  world 
trade.  Nearly  half  if  you  count  trade  between  the 
members  of  the  European  Communities. 
We  are  the  world's  biggest  trading  partners  and  thus  our 
relationship  is  fundamental  to  the  survival  of  the  open 
world  trading  system. 
But  dangers  prowl  around  like  medieval  beasts  in  the 
forest  - some  in  the  American  forest  and  some  beyond 
these  shores. 
First,  the  economic  depression 
The  current  recession  which  started  July  1981,  longer 
and  deeper  than  any  post-war  depression.  Total  output 
same  as  autumn  1979.  Emp~oyment  unchanged  yet  labour 
force  rose  by  4  million  in  this  period.  So  unemployment 
the  highest  in  40  years  at  nearly  12  million. 
Some  bright  spots  - inflation  down  to  5%. 
Interest  rates  have  fallen• 
It  could  be  argued  that  on  this  basis  we  should  be  in  a 
boom.  But  consumers  face  double  digit  unemployment  and 
growing  lay-offs. 4
No  pick-up  expected  until  the  second  half  of  1983. 
Then  the  strong  dollar 
Unemployment  and  low  capacity  utilisation generally  call 
for  selective measures.  More  general  protectionist 
pressures  from  over-valuation  of  the  dollar. 
Let  us  look  back  on  the  '70's.  In  the  final  phase  of  the 
breakdown  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system,  the  dollar  was 
over-valued  by  some  15%.  Result  the Mills  Bill  in  1970 
and  the  Burke  Hartke Bill. 
In  1976-77  the  dollar  was  again  over-valued.  The  number 
of  times  anti-dumping  or  counterfeiting  duties  were 
imposed  or  escape  clauses  invoked  rose  from  5  in  1975  to 
26  in  1976.  In  1974  unemployment  was  high  but  the  dollar 
and  the  current  account  then  in  equilibrium  the  Trade 
Act  basis  of  the  Tokyo  Round  was  passed.  But  the  dollar 
is  now  20%  over  the  '80  level,  the  yen  20%  under  valued. 
Result  rising  protectionism,  recent  struggle  in 
Congress  over  Domestic  Content  Bill,  a  Bill  in  clear 
violation  both  of  the  principles  of  the  GATT  and  the 
Ministerial  declaration  at  GATT  meeting  end  November. 
These  are  some  difficulties  to  be  seen  in  the  U.S. 5
But  of  course  the  scene  ranges  wider  than  that.  What  is 
badly  needed  in  1983  world  wide  is  economic  expansion. 
Hopes  of  economic  recovery  may  already  have  damaged 
business  and  consumer  confidence  so  that  spending  plans 
continue  to  be  deferred  and  financing  constraints  might 
be  more  severe  than  predicted. 
"Hope  deferred"  as  the  poet  said,  "maketh  the  heart 
sick". 
Unless  we  can  break  out  of  the  world  economic  recession 
the  strains  on  the  one  world  trading  system  are  going  to 
be  greater  than  anything  we  have  seen  for  the  last  35 
years. 
Then  our  major  and  continuing  anxieties  about  the 
ability  of  debt-ridden  countries  including  some  of  the 
biggest  in  the  developing  world  - and  some  of  the  major 
companies  - to  repay  and  reservice  their  bank 
borrowings. 
Then  the  strains  imposed  on  the  world  trading  system  by 
out  of  line  exchange  rates,  a  situation where  the  dollar 
is  over-valued  by  20%  and  the  Yen  undervalued  by  20%  is 6
a  recipe  for  mayhem. 
Only  three  months  ago  the  whole  stormy  scene  was 
complicated  by  increasing  tensions  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic  - steel,  the  pipeline  and  the  run  up  to  the 
GATT  Ministerial  meeting. 
But  then  in  October  and  November  some  of  the  clouds 
began  to  lift. 
On  steel  we  cut  a  deal. 
Not  a  copybook  solution  but  anyone  who  criticises it 
should  be  reminded  of  Clement  Attlee's  comment  when 
asked  what  life  was  like  at  the  age  of  80,  "Better"  he 
said,  "than  the  alternative". 
The  pipeline  sanctions  have  been  lifted. 
We  have  begun  to  search  for  a  common  approach  on  the 
difficult but  important  subject  of  economic  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Bloc. 
Then  the  GATT  Ministerial  meeting.  This,  the  first  for 
nine  years,  ended  at  10  to  5  on  the  morning  of  Monday 
November  29th. 7
The  reception  of  this  by  the  press  has  been  divided. 
We  in  the  Community  thought  it a  useful  and  successful, 
though  necessarily  not  sensational  meeting.  It 
corresponded  pretty  well  exactly  to  what  we  thought 
possible  when  we  first  started  planning  the  meeting  18 
months  ago. 
There  could  not  be  new  negotiations  because  the  results 
of  the  Tokyo  Round  were  still being  digested.  And  a 
study  on  services  will  need  a  couple  of  years  of  careful 
charting  of  the  ground  before  we  can  see  our  way  to  a 
negotiation.  What  could  be  done  was  a  realistic 
recommitment  against  protectionism  on  the  part  of  the 
world's  trading  Ministers  and  a  useful  programme  of 
work,  services  - some  further  work  on  safeguards,  a 
study  on  agricultural  export  subsidies  and  other 
relevant  forms  of  agricultural  protection. 
It is  true  that  there  were  some  exaggerated  expectations 
particularly  on  agriculture.  But  we  have  consistently 
made  it  clear  that  we  were  not  willing  to  re-open  one 8
sector  of  a  very  difficult  and  hard  fought  negotiation 
only  three  years  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Tokyo 
Round.  All  the  more  so  since  we  do  not  notice  any  great 
interest  elsewhere  in  re-opening  other  parts  such  as  the 
tariff  on  woollen  textiles  in  some  of  our  main  markets. 
But  agriculture  remains  a  difficulty  between  us. 
These  may  be  some  of  the  famous  last  words  of  1982. 
Here  on  this  side  of  the Atlantic  the  Common 
Agricultural  Policy  has  been built  up  as  some  kind  of 
fiendish  plot  by  Europeans  to  impoverish  American 
farmers.  So  since  a  good  deal  will  be  heard  on  this  in 
1983  let  me,  before  we  finish  1982,  say  a  few  words 
about  it. 
Why,  you  may  ask,  should  we  have  a  Common  Agricultural 
Policy? 
Why  not  simply  let  the  market  work? 
The  answer  is  rooted  in  the  history  of  our  Community. 
In  1957  the  original  six  member  countries  of  the  EEC 
faced  a  major  problem  in  freeing  trade  internally. 
Freeing  trade  in  industrial  goods  could  largely  be 9
achieved  by  cutting  tariffs. 
This  would  not  have  been  acceptable  without  freeing 
trade also  in  agricultural  goods. 
But  the  very  different  agricultural  structures  in  the 
Member  States  and  the  different varieties  of  protection 
meant  that  simply  cutting  tariffs  for  agricultural 
products  would  heve  been  largely  meaningless.  The  only 
solution  was  the  harmonisation  of  these  different 
agricultural  policies  in  a  common  European  policy.  Thus 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  became  a  key  element  in  a 
European  integration.  Without  it  there  could  be  no 
Community. 
What  is  the  CAP  trying  to  do? 
The  CAP's  goals  are  very  much  the  same  as  those  of  the 
U.S.  farm  policy  : 
to  increase  productivity 
to  secure  a  fair  standard  of  living  for  the  farm 
population 
market  stability 
supply  assurance 
and  reasonable  consumer  prices 10
The  means  by  which  these  objectives  were  sought  - a 
uniform  internal  price  level,  export  refunds  when  this 
is  higher  than  the  world  market  and  variable  levies  on 
imports  below  this  internal  price  - are  well  known  to 
those  who  are  interested  and  incomprehensible  to  those 
who  are  not. 
What  you  will  want  to  know  is  how  was  the  policy  worked 
out. 
Here  let me  deal  with  two  illusions. 
The  first  is  that  the  CAP  has  helped  to  maintain 
outdated  structures.  The  fact,  however,  is  that  over  the 
last  20  years  the  E.C.  labour  force  occupied  in 
agriculture,  has  decreased  by  half  from  18  million  to 
less  than  9  million  including  the  farm  force  in  Greece, 
the  E.G.'s  newest  member.  During  the  same  period  the 
average  farm  size  doubled  to  about  45  acres  and 
productivity  rose  sharply. 
Another  illusion  is  that  the  CAP  has  featherbedded  its 
farmers.  Average  farm  income  just  kept  pace  with 
industrial  income  until  1975  but  since  1976  real  farm 11
income  has  remained  stagnant  at  least;  in  1979  and  1980 
it actually  fell. 
On  prices,  these  have  been  stabilised  general  at  a 
higher  level  than  in  the  u.s.  but  assurance  of  supply 
like  any  insurance  policy,  costs  and  real  prices  for  a 
number  of  foodstuffs  have  fallen  in  recent  years.  Where 
we  have  exceeded  self-sufficiency,  we  have  adopted 
measures  to  discourage  over  production  and  we  have 
increased  our  dependance  on  outside  suppliers  for 
products  of  particular  interest  to  the  u.s.  such  as 
soybeans  and  corn  gluten  feed. 
Then  it is  alleged  that  we  have  built  a  trade  wall 
around  our  imports  of  farm  goods. 
The  European  Community  is  in  fact  the  biggest  importer 
of  agricultural  goods  in  the  world.  In  1980  it accounted 
for  a  quarter  of  all world  agricultural  imports  and  it 
ran  a  trade deficit  on  agriculture  of  29  billion 
dollars;  its deficit with  the  u.s.  in  this  areas  was  no 
less  than  7  billion dollars  making  it  the  American 
farmer's  largest  customer.  The  9  billion dollars  worth 
of  U.S.  farm  products  which  the  E.C.  bought  in  1981 12
(half  of  them  came  in  duty  and  levy  free)  included  2.8 
billion dollars  of  soybeans,  1.7  grains  and  cereal 
preparations,  1.6  of  animal  foodstuffs  and  680  million 
dollars  of  fruits  and  vegetables.  Only  about  15%  of  EEC 
farm  imports  from  industrialised  countries  entered 
subject  to  levy  and  duty.  Nearly  all  imports  from 
developing  countries  enter  the  EEC  levy  free  and  at  very 
low  duties  if  there  are  any  duties  at  all· 
But  it is  argued  that  the  Community  has  turned  for 
various  products  from  a  net  importer  to  a  net  exporter. 
True.  But  in  the  1950's  large  sections  of  European 
agriculture  were  inefficient  and  out  of  date. 
The  CAP  has  brought  about  a  revolution  in  productivity. 
Just  as  productivity'has  increased  in  the  u.s.  so  it has 
in  the  E.c. 
In  both  countries  for  example  yields  of  cereals  have 
doubled  over  the  last  20  years  due  to  better  seeds  and 
cultivation  techniques. 
Then  we  come  to  the  argument  about  subsidies. 13
Has  not  this  major  expansion  of  EEC  export  of  farm 
products  been  based  on  large  government  subsidies? 
Both  the  u.s.  and  the  Community  subsidise  their 
agriculture.  Comparisons  of  expenditure  are  difficult 
partly because  methods  of  support  as  well  as  budgetary 
treatment  are  different,  partly  because  public 
expenditure  is  only  one  element  influencing  the  farmer's 
income  - measures  such  as  import  restrictions  for  sugar, 
dairy  and  beef  products  among  others  in  the  United 
States  have  an  income  support  effect  without  implying 
public  expenditure.  But  government  farm  price  support  is 
substantial  on  both  sides  of  the Atlantic.  In  1982 
Community  farm  price  support,  originally  programmed  at 
14  billion dollars  maximum  is  now  likely  to  amount  to  12 
billion.  In  the  United  States  in  the  same  year  Federal 
income  support  has  been  estimated  at  nearly  12  billion 
dollars. 
Naturally  our  Member  States  have  agricultural  budgets  of 
their  own  but  such  budgets  are  focusing  mostly  on 
structural  assistance  and  social  measures  as  do 
programmes  in  other  parts  of  the  u.s.  Federal  budget  and 
in  the  U.S.  State  budgets. 14
Then  there  are  substantial  additional  amounts  in  our 
Member  States  and  in  your  u.s.  State budgets.  And 
relevant  to  all  these  comparisons  difficult  though  it is 
to  compare  apples  and  pears  is  the  factor  that  the 
agricultural  population  of  the  U.S.  is  a  good  deal  less 
than  half  that  of  the  Community.  A  factor  which  in  so 
far  as  assistance  per  head  can  be  calculated  needs  to  be 
borne  in  mind. 
It  was  in  the  light of  these  facts  that  the  Tokyo  Round 
to  which  the  U.S.  was  a  party  recognised  agricultural 
export  subsidies  and  agreed  that  these  were  permitted 
providing  that  they  do  not  allow  any  GATT  contracting 
party  to  secure  by  these  means  more  than  an  equitable 
share  of  world  trade.  We  think  we  have  kept  to  this 
undertaking.  Our  wheat  exports  for  example  doubled  in 
the  1970's  to  14  million  tonnes  but  our  share  in  fact 
fell  marginally.  World  trade  was  expanding  even  more 
rapidly,  and  u.s.  exports  nearly  trebled. 
If  this  has  sounded  too  much  like  a  defence  of  the  CAP 
as  a  perfect  and  immutable  system,  let  me  simply  say 15
that  it is neither  perfect  nor  immutable.  The  principles 
of  the  policy  are  part  of  the  constitution  of  an 
emerging  Europe  and  are  as  easily  changed  as  your 
Constitution.  But  the  CAP  is  not  a  system  of  open-ended 
guarantees  on  unlimited  quantities.  The  Community  budget 
much  be  balanced  and  increasingly  there  will  be 
financial  constraints  on  agricultural  expenditure.  So 
the  CAP  uses  price  flexibility  and  other  measures  to 
ensure  that  its objectives  can  be  achieved  in  a  changing 
world  at  a  reasonable  cost. 
A  number  of  measures  have  recently  been  implemented  to 
ensure  a  better  matching  of  supply  and  demand  and  to 
make  producers  aware  of  the  costs  of  over-production. 
Financial  support  for  EEC  grown  sugar  has  been 
eliminated  and  producers  must  bear  all  the  costs  of 
storage  and  disposal-of  surplus  sugar  themselves. 
Production  in  1982  is  expected  to  drop  by  9%  from  1981 
levels. 
A  ceiling  of  119.5  million  tonnes  has  been  set  for  all 
cereals  excluding  durum  wheat  and  rice  for  the  1982/83 
period.  If  average  production  over  the  three  marketing 
years  1980/81  to  1982/83  exceeds  this  level  intervention 16
prices  in  1983/84  will  be  reduced.  In  the  dairy  sector 
we  have  applied  for  some  years  a  farmer 
co-responsibility  levy  which  now  covers  10%  of  the 
surplus  disposal  costs.  In  addition  appropriate  action 
will  be  taken  if  deliveries  of  milk  in  1982  exceed  those 
in  1981  by  more  than  0.5%.  It  looks  as  if  this  will  be 
the  case  and  so  the  EEC  Commission  has  recently  proposed 
a  2.2  reduction  in  the  1983/84  intervention  price.  A 
decision  on  this  proposal  will  have  to  be  made  in  the 
spring. 
I  set  out  these  facts  in  order  to  try  and  show  you  that 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  is  not  a  devilish  plot, 
nor  is  it responsible  for  the  present  very  difficult 
state  of  u.s.  agriculture. 
These  are  the  result~ of  far  more  telling  factors  such 
as  high  interest  rat~s,  a  strong  dollar,  lower  exports 
to  the  Soviet  Union,  record  harvests  and  the  world 
recession. 
But  it is  clear  that  there  will  be  a  good  deal  of 
pressure  next  year  in  Congress  and  in  this  country  on 
agriculture.  And  some  of  the  points  I  have  just  made 17
came  up  in  discussion  on  December  10  in  Brussels,  when 
your  Secretary  of  State  and  four  of  his  most  senior 
Cabinet  colleagues  sat  down  with  the  President  of  the 
Commission  and  his  team  to  talk  about  the  trade  issues 
between  us. 
It will  be  no  surprise  that  agriculture  occupied  a  major 
part  of  the  proceedings. 
What  distinguished  the  discussion  was  the  sensible  and 
constructive  tone.  Those  who  attended  it were  the  people 
who  had  looked  over  the  abyss  and  did  not  like  what  they 
saw.  Both  of  us  agreed  to  avoid  rhetoric  and  see  what 
could  be  done  within  existing  systems  on  both  sides  of 
the  Atlantic. 
We  need  to  start with  some  detailed  talks  with  our  u.s. 
opposite  numbers  here  i~ Washington  in  mid-January  on 
agriculture. 
We  need  to  report  to  our  principals  by  the  end  of  March. 
It would  not  be  realistic  to  hope  that  all  our 
difficulties  on  the  agricultural  front  could  be  wished 
away  by  detailed  talks  among  senior  officials. 18
But  what  was  encouraging  about  December  10  was  the 
political will  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  to  respect 
each  other's  fundamental  policies  and  principles  but  to 
see  whether  we  could  not  find  some  way  within  these  to 
accommodate  each  other. 
So  when  1982  rings  out  shortly  I  think  looking  back  on 
it we  can  reckon  that  we  have  made  some  progress. 
We  have  agreed  to  concentrate,  not  on  rhetoric  but  on 
solving  problems. 
We  have  agreed  in  other  words  to  take  our 
responsibilities  as  the  two  great  trading  powers  of  the 
world  in  preserving  the  open  world  trading  system  on 
which  the  prosperity  and  peace  of  the  West  depend. 
So  however  difficult  1983  may  be,  we  enter  it with  a 
sense  of  hope. 